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PREFACE *
The motivation for the selection of this thesis topic
is professionally oriented. As a career Marine officer,
nearing his twentieth year of service, the author finds himself
somewhat parochial in his fields of interest; hence ohe Depart-
ment of Defense Project PRIME, a recently implemented innova-
tion to the Department of Defense planning, programming, and
budgeting system, has been chosen as a topic
.
As a corollary consideration in the selection of this
research topic, the author must also address the immediate
personal aspects of his choice. Having been unofficially
informed that his next tour of duty will be, in all likelihood,
in a comptroller position within a Marine Corps Division now
located in Vietnam, the author, hopefully, would achieve not
only the primary goal of meeting the thesis requirement for the
Degree of Master of Business Administration from the George
Washington University, but, at the same time, acquire informa-
tion which would be of considerable value In a comptroller duty
assignment
.
The author of this thesis is deeply grateful to a host
of Department of Defense and service officials who took time
from busy schedules to grant interviews and respond to the
author's queries, provide reference material, and present their




noteworthy in this regard are: Mr. Thoma3 S." Johnson, Special
Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller);
Mr. Laurence E. Olewine, Director of Financial Management and
Education, also from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller); Mr. Keene Peterson, an Operations
Analyst within the Directorate of Utilization and Management
Techniques, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs); Lieutenant Colonel John A.
Cottom, USMC, Assistant Head of the Operations and Maintenance
Section, Budget Branch, Fiscal Division, Headquarters, USMC;
and Lieutenant Colonel Heman J. Redfield, III, USMC, Head,
Management Analysis and Review Section, also within the Fiscal
Division at Headquarters, Marine Corps.
While the author is indeed grateful to the aforemen-
tioned persons, he must absolve them from any responsibility
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Since 1961, and the appointment of Mr. Robert S.
McNamara as Secretary of Defense, there have been many and
significant changes in management concepts and control tech-
niques within the Department of Defense. To a large extent
these evolutionary developments have been prompted by
necessity; i.e., the escalating cost of national defense as
emphasized by national involvement in the recent Korean War
(1950-1953); the Lebanon Crisis (1958); the Cuban Crisis
(1962); the Dominican Republic Crisis (1965)1 and, currently,
the Vietnam War (1965-?). Of course, the dynamic nature of
defense functions is a major contributory factor, particularly
the rapid and profuse development of weapons technology and
systems, and the extraordinary co3t of these systems. Most
of these management innovations have been pointed toward
provement of the planning, programming, budgeting, account
-
g, and decision-making techniques utilized by the Department
of Defense.
1
Perhaps the most significant of these recent changes is
a program entitled Project PRIME. This thesis, in succeeding
llndustrial College of the Armed Forces Monograph,
Defense Resource Management Systems: Project PRIME
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 1.

2tpters, will provide the reader with a close look at Project
E: its relation to the Marine Corps Comptroller, an
evaluation of his functions, and, finally progress and expec-
tations. In order to accomplish the task, emphasis will be
placed on providing answers to the following questions:
(1) What is Project PRIME?
(2) What is PRIME'S effect on the Marine Corps
Comptroller's function?
(3) What is PRIME'S effect on the Marine Corps
financial control system?
(4) What advantages (or disadvantages), if any,
will accrue to the commander as a result of PRIME?
If answers to these questions can be determined, then
the basic research question: "What is the impact of PRIME on
the Marine Corps Comptroller and on financial management within
the Marine Corps"? will also be satisfied.
Principal attention will be focused on a conceptual
approach to Project PRIMS, as PRIME was recently initiated
(July 1, 1968) and, therefore, has not generated sufficiently
reliable data or experience for illustrative purposes.
I
Although nearly nine months have elapsed since its inception,
the reader should realize that with any major overhaul of
existing systems-, or the initiation of new ones, there are
obstacles which must be overcome; e.g., the procurement of
lLieutenant Colonel John A. Cottom, interview with the
Assistant Head, Operations and Maintenance Section, Budget
anch, Fiscal Division, Headquarters,' U.S. Marine Corps,
Washington, D.C., December i960.

3additional funds and personnel to implement the new system
as well as the reorientation of present personnel in the
concepts and requirements of the new system. Of course, there
is the inherent "operational lag, " or that gap from the begin-
ning of a policy change to the attainment of the desired
results. 1 To put it another way, the ultimate success or
failure of Project PRIME is contingent upon acceptance at all
levels within applicable Department of Defense components.
The users and reviewers must be convinced that PRIME provides
improvement over existing systems at a reasonable cost. 2
Project PRIME is an acronym for PRIority Management
Effort and is a system designed by the Department of Defense
for internal Departmental use. As a consequence, traditional
reference material and publications (textbooks, private-
commercial reviei\?s, periodicals, and writings by learned
authors) outside of the Department of Defense are scarce;
however, many of the principles espoused by the advocates of
PRIME are contained in standard textbooks. This will be
evidenced by footnote as the thesis develops
.
To keep this treatise in proper perspective, however,
research material and references, of necessity, must be drawn
^-David J. Ott and Attiat P. Ott, Federal Budget Policy
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 196:2), p. 71.
^Murray L. Weidenbaum, "Program Budgeting"—Applying
Economic Analysis to Government Expenditure Decisions, in
Planning, Programming,, and Budgeting: A Systems Approach to
agement , ed. by Fremont 3T Lyden and Ernest G. Miller
{Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1967)* p. 171.

4.nly from the Department of Defense and Headquarters , Marine
Corps, and will include reliance on primary sources of infor-
icn, such as personal interviews with knowledgeable Defense
and Marine Corps officials, and directives internal to the
artment of Defense and the Marine Corps. In this regard,
author found the quantity of material available on Project
to be voluminous, conceptual, and, in some cases,
repetitious; hence the author has prepared this thesis in the
form of a "literature survey" to cull out the extraneous and
to the essence. The citation of action cases and survey
reports, however, are meant to be indicative of findings, rather
than exhaustive, due to limited experience with this new pro-
gran: .
The study will trace a path, commencing in Chapter II
with a history of Project PRIME, which will show Project PRIME'S
effect on existing systems for programming, budgeting, and
management accounting. This chapter will also describe the
substance of PRIMS, i.e., the new accounting system; Chapter
III will transplant PRIMS to the environment of the Marine
Corps Comptroller and his functions, including funding sources,
budgeting and accounting techniques, and military personnel
costing. Chapter IV" will (l) summarize Congressional reaction,
(2) outline the Navy and Marine Corp3 position, (3) highlight
the current status of PRIME as seen through the Department of
Defense on-site surveys, and (4) relate some divergent views






Project PRIME is not new in concept. Mr. George W.
Bergquist, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
stated in 1966 with reference to Project PRIME:
In a real sense, there is nothing new in management.
The fundamentals of planning, communicating, motivating,
measuring progress and all the rest are the same funda-
mentals that Moses used on the desert. What is new and
hat must be new is, of course, the mode of application
of these principles, particularly under the impact of
new technology in communications and computers. . . .I
A more applicable and current analogy would be to look
as far back as 1947, when the First Hoover Commission chartered
to study the organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government, postulated, et al :
We recommend that the whole budgeting concept should
be refashioned by the adoption of a budget based on func-
tions, activities, and projects: this we designate a
"performance budget. "2
This particular recommendation was accepted that same
year by Congress who followed closely by amending the National
•'George W. Bergquist, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
nse (Comptroller), "Better V/ays of Doing Busines s in the
r:ey:artment of Defense ." Address to the 19bo Graduating Class
: the Army Comptrollership School, Syracuse University,
Syracuse, New York, on July 28, 1966.
^Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
le Government, Budgeting and Accountin g: A Report to the
Congress (Washington, liTC™ Government Printing uri'ice, ±949),
p . £ •
5

ority Act of 19^7 3 to read:
To account for, and report, the cost of performance
of readily identifiable functional programs and activities,
th segregation of operating and capital programs budget
iates of the Department of Defense shall be prepared,
presented, and justified, where practicable, and authorized
programs shall be administered, in such form and manner as
Le Secretary of Defense, subject to the authority and
direction of the President, may prescribe.!
Although there was some discussion by Congress of the
kind of budget intended, it may properly be inferred that the
Inking of both the Hoover Commission and the members of
Congress was shaped primarily by their concern for improving
congressional review and for reducing the number and improving
the presentation of the programs with which the appropriate
committees must deal. In any case, this legislative enact-
ment laid the groundwork for the establishment of "performance
budgeting' 1 throughout the Department of Defense. Concurrently,
appropriation committees within the Congress redesigned the
Department of Defense appropriation structure, reducing the
number of accounts from more than 100 into a structure of
about forty accounts, which were grouped into five major
functional categories : Personnel; Operations and Maintenance;
Procurement; Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation; and
. Litary Construction. 3 This categorization follows the First
^-National Security Act of 19 jJ--7.> U.S. Code , Vol. X, sec.
2203, (19WF.
2Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1956), p. 135.
3lndustrial College of the Armed Forces Monograph,
Defense Resource Management Systems: Project PRIME
, p. 2.

7over Commission's recommendations, i.e., Military Personnel
and Operations and Maintenance appropriations were considered
operating programs; Procurement, Military Construction, and
earch, Development, Test, and Evaluation appropriations were
considered investment, or capital programs. This appropriation
3tructure continues in effect today
.
Six years later, in 1955, a Second Hoover Commission
was. formed in compliance to Public Law 108, enacted by the 83rd
Congress. The Commission favorably noted the improvements in
the budgetary process as recommended by the First Hoover
Commission and, specifically, the National Security Act Amend-
ments of 1949 (PL 8l-2l6). However, in their examination of
Department of Defense, the Commission noted that a great
deal of work remained to be done. The Commission found that:
In the Department of Defense, management control has
been attempted in part through the control of funds under
an overdetailed and cumbersome allotment structure . The
control and accountability for appropriated funds is, of
course, essential in order that the Department may comply
with the constitutional authority. However, this does not
require an allotment system as detailed and meticulous as
that which has been employed. The effect of attempting to
control operations through such a system has been to place
emphasis upon the ability of organizational units to expend
not more than predetermined ceilings. The ability to live
within such ceilings is not a real gage of performance . In
fact, it puts a premium on the ability to expend all allot-
ments since the allotments for one year are used as one
indication of the amounts required for the succeeding year.
We believe that appropriated funds should be controlled
under a system whereby there would be only one allotment to
an organizational unit from each applicable appropriation.
As a guide to judging performance, accounting systems should
be developed within organizational units from which perform-
ance in terms of cost can be obtained. Costs of. support
3-Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the
Budget, The Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1969 (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 66.

3ctivities in the D< merit of Defense have particular
ificance and to be valid must include, as they do not
now j the costs of military personnel employed in them.
Cost information to; • with other performance yardsticks
in terms of production or services rendered, should be used
to measure performance.
1
To sum up, the present allotment system is a counter-
rt of the primitive cash system of control which was
relied upon in the early days of industry. At the turn of
the century many businesses were managed through control
of the checkbook. However, as industrial operations became
more complex and management required more complete financial
information, accounting techniques were developed to meet
; iment needs . As a result industry depends today upon
accrual accounting under which costs are ascertainable.
- .counting in the Federal Government still is concerned
mainly with cash and has not kept pace with the needs of
management, arising from the ever increasing complexity in
Government operations. 2
In closing its examination the Commission formulated
a series of recommendations. Those considered particularly
germane to this thesis are as follows:
Hecommendation No. 8
That the executive budget continue to be based upon
functions, activities, and projects but be redesignated as
"program budget." The program budget should be supported
by information of program costs and accomplishments and by
a review of performance by organizational units where they
do not coincide with program budget classifications.
Recommendation No. 9
That the agencies take further steps to synchronize
their organization structures, budget program classifica-
tions, and accounting systems.
Recommendation No. 14
That for management purposes, cost-based operating
(•
^Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government, Task Force Report on Budgeting 3.n6. Accounting




be used to determine fund allocations within the
icies, such budgets to be supplemented by periodic
reports on performance.
Recommendation No. 21
That Government accounts be kept on the accrual basis
to show, currently, completely, and clearly all resources
and liabilities and the costs of operations. Furthermore,
agency budgeting and financial reporting should be developed
cm such accrual accounting.
.-commendation No. 24
That in the Department of Defense the accounting
procedures be revised to include military pay as an element
of cost of support activities of an administrative or service
ature . 3-
As with the First Hoover Commission, the Congress
reacted favorably to a major portion of these recommendations
.
By amendment to the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of
1950, the essence, if not the verbatim language, of the Second
Hoover Commission was enacted into public law in 1956. This
amendment is quoted in part:
Section 2
(a) The head of each executive agency shall . . .
ike whatever action that may be necessary to achieve . .
) consistency in accounting and budget classifications,
(2) synchronization between accounting and budget classi-
..cations and organizational structure, and (3/ support
of the budget justifications by information on performance
and program costs by organizational units
.
(c) As soon as practicable after August 1, 1956,
the head of each executive agency shall, in accordance
,th principles and standards prescribed by the Comptroller
neral, cause the accounts of such agency to be maintained
on an accrual basis to show the resources, liabilities , and
costs of operations of such agency with a view to facilitat-
g the preparation of cost-based budgets. ...
llbid.
, pp. 3-6.
2An Act to Improve Governmental .Budgeting and Ac count «-




It can be surmised from the rapidity with which both
L st and Second Hoover Commissions' recommendations were
icted into law that Congress was extremely desirous for
j-nges and improvement of financial management within the
Federal Government. A perusal of the several preceding pages
of this thesis would reveal that Congress, by its action, now
required that Federal agencies provide:
(1) Consistency and synchronization between program-
ming, budgeting, and accounting classifications by organiza-
tional unit
.
(2) Cost-based program budgets segregating operating
costs from investment costs
.
(3) Accrual accounting.
(4) A management reporting system that would measure
actual organization performance/progress as compared to
planned performance/progress toward approved objectives.
As a parallel and concurrent action to the Budgeting
and Accounting Act of 1950, the Joint Financial Management
movement Program, first conceived in 19^-7 > could now draw
statutory authority from this legislation. This Program, under
the joint leadership of the Comptroller General, the Secretary
the Treasury, and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget,
- .d three objectives: (l) to provide the agencies with the
tools to assist in improved planning, execution, and control
of operations and thus- encourage better management in the
Executive Branch, (2) to provide the Congress with more
ningful information for use in acting on appropriations and

11
ition, and (5) to enable 3 public to obtain a
3-r picture of the financial condition and operations of
leral Government.
Based on recommendations of this "troika," President
.nson released in May, 19S6 3 a memorandum to all agencies
apartments which provided renewed emphasis for the
rovement o*f financial management within the Federal Govern-
it. The President expressed concern over the lagging
progress in this area by stating:
I have a strong and continuin merest in the
/elopment of business-like financial systems throughout
the I al Government. . . . We must have financial
systems which:
--provide the information our managers need for effective
st control—for wa bhe war on waste,
—develop cost consc 3 in men and women at every
level of responsibility in every agency,
—assure financial integrity in everything the Government
—provide the ; of financial data needed to support
the planning-programming-budgeting system initiated . . .
—enable the Government to apply the best and most efficient
rient and operating techniques.
3 legislative groundwork for this program was laid
sixteen years ago. While much progress has been made much
more is necessary if we are to discharge the responsibility
placed upon us by the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act
of 1950. Accordingly, I request the head of each executive
partment and agency to take immediate action to:
--Insure that the system of accounting and internal control
lComptroll sneral of the United States, Accounting,
: ;a and S /op Federal Agencies (Washington,
D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1905) (revised 19677* p. 2-2.
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aent needs and conforms to the
les, standards, and related requirements prescribed
the Comptroller General,
—Assure that financial reports and cost data provide
te support for the planning-programming-budgeting
systc
—See that the agency J s managers are given the basic tools
1 1—responsibility centered cost-based operating
idgets and financial reports—for setting and achieving
- cost reduction goals,
.o,I want evevy ma:.. —the general manager and the
mcial :- alike—to feel and respond to your personal
nds for the use of highest quality, business-
type financial information systems.
• ••••••#•••*#•• + •••*•#•••• + #•••
I want every manager to think of his part of the
total Government in _car::i of everything he owns, everything
he owes and the full cost of doing every job in relation to
the products resulting from these costs. I want him to
think of minimal costs and cost reduction as profit. . . .1
The President's memorandum was followed "oy the Secretary
of Defense's memorandum to all the military departments, et al .
.s memorandum acknowledged the Presidential memorandum,
further amplified its intent, and set forth specific changes
tt soon would be forthcoming in the financial management of
all operating activities financed by the Military Personnel and
Operations and Maintenance appropriations. These planned
changes were stated as
:
(l) A new accounting structure is being designed with
accounts arr I so that they will provide information in
e form needed (a) for programming, (b) for budgeting, and
) to assist man;:, it in operations. This will permit
ie integration of the programming, budgeting, and manage-
nt processes.
lU.S. President Memorandum for the Heads of Departments
Agencies, dated May 24, 1966, pp. 1-2.
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(2) The focus will be on outputs and on resources
that is , on ex; *s. This requires that the costs
.: ci separately by t. Litary Personnel and Operations
and I merged for DOD m ;ement
poses, /into a . operating budget/ although the
se entity of these appropriations will be main-
tained s to meet external requirements unless the
Congres ...sts that cr ey be combined.
(3) To the extent feasible, consumable items will be
moved from the pi appropriations to the operating
propriations, and .tal items will be moved from the
sratii to the procurement appropriations.
. purification process will permit a more accurate
'lection of actual oper g expenses chargeable to the
operations and maintenance appropriations^
(4) Working capital funds or accounts will be used
extensively to hold resources in suspense between the time
id place of ac d the time and place of consump-
on. /The extension of working capital permits the charging
of it from inves - b-type appropriations to be
cha _to operations and maintenance appropriations when
issued^
(5) Management reports will be structured in terms
of organizational responsibility and will relate actual
erformance to planned performance and actual expenses to
planned expenses.
1
Subsequently, it was further stated that the foregoing
changes would be implemented en July 1, 1967.^
The magnitude of these changes in programming, budget-
ing, and accounting, coupled with the short time element, i.e.,
slightly more than one year prior to planned implementation,
pted the acronym and short-title Project PRIME, or PRIority
o
- t Effort.-*
lU.S. Secretary of Defense Memorandum to the Military
Departments, et al ., dated June 13, 1966, pp. 1-2.
2 Ibid., p. 2.
3lndustrial College of the Armed Forces, Defense




.1 of programming b- :.ng, and accountir,''
.led to the :>c;.:,rtment of Defense, the urgent
d for improved financial - merit expressed in the
sntial memorandum was not a new subject. In 1949 Mr.
lfred J. McNeil, the first Comptroller of the Department of
5e, had designed and commenced implementation of _
"performance-type budget." In 196l Mr. McNeil was succeeded
by Mr. Charles J. Hitch as Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller). During his tenure in that office (1961 to '1965),
.
Hitch continued the trend toward a performance-type budget
bhe development and implementation of the Five-Year Force
Structure and Financial Plan (redesignated as the Five-Year
rise Program in 1965)* although no comprehensive effort
was made to relate these individual management systems to
each other, i.e., programming to budgeting. x Secretary of
Defense -a, early in his tenure, noted:
The effective management of approved programs also
requires a reporting system that keeps top officials
constantly informed of the progress being made in achieving
established objectives—in both physical and financial
terms on the basis of program entities and not merely in
terms of bits and pieces of programs financed in various
appropriation accounts.
2
As recently as 1965, Melvin Anshen, a noted author




2u.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report of the
•
:,ary of Defense, July 1, i960 to June 30, 196 1
shington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 19o2), p. 27
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... It presents requests (and co t appropria-
f direct object: sxpenditure, such
rsonnel" or "vehicles. ' Rarely can these objects
of expenditure be re! any meaningful way to
scific administrative pre
_ , even vZien these pro-
3 fail within the scope of a single executive depart-
nt. . . .1
Programming in 1961 was in terms of mission-oriented
binations of men, material, and installations. For example,
I (General Purpose Forces) and the Five-Year Defense
am, consisted of pi m elements, such as Navy Carrier
ly Divisions, Marine Divisions, etc. On the other
»ting and financial accounting for these organiza-
tion remained structure . terms of object classes, e.g.,
military personnel, procurement of supplies/equipment,
rations and maintenance, without regard to organizational
entity or mission. To translate a program into a budget
-sitated a laborious ana inaccurate conversion process of
-I requirements of the functional entities and organizations
within the Five-Year Defense Program to the input -oriented
appropriation structure of the President's budget. ^ In
.rt, neither the performance budget, nor the accounting
stem of the Defense Department, corresponded to the present
;lvin Anshen, Ur2he Federal Budget as an Instrument
for Management and Analysis " in Program Budgeting: Program
le Federal Go 1 nent, ed. by David Novick
..
: Harvard University Press, 19&5), P« 13.
2Lieutenant Con .--.rider Steven Lazarus, USN, "Planning-
Programming-Budgeting Systems and Project PRIME, " in Planning ,
ling, Budgeting
:
A Systems Approach to Management , ed
.
by Fremont J. I/ydon & Ernest G. Miller i Chicago: .-.arkham




ucture.3- The results of this gap were threefold:
(1) The authority for the use of resources did not
tch the re; sibility given to comma: for
To the extent this is so 5 the
.nder ting the resource actions
jary to fulfill hie ssion responsibilities.
(2) The accounting structure did not produce infor-
bion on actual resources used in the categories /of the
ive-Ye rise Pi ,ich planning deci are
de. fore, the accounting records did not provid
;ion that can be used for determining whether cost
had been relatively accurate., and/or that they
•can be used as a basis for future planning in the same
terms
.
(3) Eecause the accounting system had not oeen
ttured -he terms used in planning, top managers
und it difficult, in some cases nearly impossible,
to determine w 3 decisions had been implemented
in the way that was intended. . , .2
Upon the appointment of Dr. Robert N. Anthony in 1965,
tant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), his inherited
tat 3 to mesh these functions so that the program, the
budget, the accounting system, and the reporting systems would
comparable; i.e., to design a system that would lay the
j.ndwork for budget submission to the Congress in mission-
oriented terms, provide an accounting system reconcilable to
s appropriation structure, and have the capability for
pro reporting against each program.
lArthur Smithies, "Conceptual Framework for the Program
Budget, " in Program Budgeting: ?rop:ram Ana?tysis and the
ai Government
, p. 34.
^Comptroller General of the United States, "Opinion
c_ • the Accounting Sys tern fey Operations Proposed for*" . 3~
"
:
:lon July 1. 19*58 , in accordance with Section o"-"".:'' ,~b
)
.rtment of :propriatlon Act, ±9c8 , _-:o-oort
to the 1 ess " (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,




. accomplish this task, a "common denominator, " or
?k; had to be defined and established wherein all
ice organizational units, functions, and activities could
be categorised and identified by mission. While such a frame-
existed within the Department of Defense, i.e.,
j Five-Year Defense Program, it should be recalled that the
ructure was aligned and imp." ted during a
tonth period in 196i.~ Although refinements had been
.id since its inception, the magnitude of Project PRIME
:.d a further overhaul of the Department of Defense
. to include a reexamination and reevaluation
of the existing Five -Year Defense Program. Hence, each program
program element was reviewed in light of three criteria:
(1) "Was it an operating tool for the Defense manager?
(2) Would it allow both broad aggregation of data
d detailed presentation of data that would be meaningful
to different managers?
(3) Would it allow7 the application of a systematic
ins of measuring actual use of resources against planned
and approved programs?2
Results of this review both redescribed and increased
the number of major programs within the Five-Year Defense
Pre nine to ten, as follows:




2u.S. Department of Defense Handbook 7045. 7H, FYDP
icture -Codes and De finitions (Washington , D . C .
:
iment Printing Office, 1967^* PP. 1-2.
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Program I — St: Forces
Program II — General Purpose Forces
Program III —« Intelligence and Communications
Program IV -- Airlift and Sealift Forces
ogram V — :. and Reserve Forces
ram VI ~~ Research and Development
Program VII — sral Supply and Maintenance
Program VIII-- Training, Medical, and other General
..-•sonne 1 Activiti
Program IX — Administration and Associated
bivities
Program -- Support of other Nations-*-
he restructuring of basic programs permitted Defense
: managers to more clearly distinguish at the major program
si: (a) those activities directly related to defense
post on which independent decisions could be made, and
e activities whose size and resources were essentially
ient en the size and position of the independent activi-
ties , 2
As a result of this restructuring, Programs number I
l VI, and are now considered to be independent programs.
s number VII, VIII, and IX are considered to be dependent
llbid.
'^Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Def .:.-"
nt Systems : Project PRIME




A ..lei effort was also made to reexamine and
. the inc -"* elements within the major
.
prograj .:! to be related to units or
tions and specifically to that level where one person,
eder o eager, is identifiable as responsible within
h program elc . Each program element could then describe
id serve as a device for collecting dzational
costs. Results of this review increased the number of program
iments from approximately 850 to more than 1100 program
Particular emphasis in redesign and revamping the Five-
Year Defense Progi is loo ed in Program VII, then titled
el Support. Heretofore, there had been too large a
grouping of pi m functions in support of independent pro-
, definitions of pro^ . elements had not been consistent,
eing expens ere not, therefore, readily relatable to
Lons . If visible, t operating expenses were unreliable
s to differences in dee .ens and accounting methods.^-
Dr. Anthony noted an example of these inconsistencies
in a recent address before the Defense Management Class at the
iDepartment of Defense Handbook 7045. 7H, I/YDe Program
StrT .tions
, p. 3.
2:;. brial College of the Armed Forces, Resource




e. George W. I euist, "Better Ways of Do:
n the Pep: t of Defense . "

.j choc:..
•ive-Y Program as it appeared in 1966
aid lead you 2 Air Force spent about 4
•what the Navy spent on that program </the program
element, general proc -. nd supply operations/7".
2 situation is not at all like this. Most
of = apparent diff - arise from inconsistencies
t le definitions used by the Air Force and the Navy.
. example, the Ai] eluded its supply depots
ram, e Navy included its tidewater
:.ly de snt program. If we applied
..ria to the Force, the Air Force's
.; would come down to $3l6 million. There are
a lot of these inconsistencies and they have certain
obvious consequences. . . .-*-
le purification of the programming structure
.zation of program element definitions within
j -Year Defense Program, a common reference point, i.e.,
d program elei , had been established for which
. 5s could be provided and against which costs could be
a 1 d .
What was urgently needed (and provides the subject of
i.s thesis), was a uniform accounting system that would
"bridge the gap" between programming, which was conducted J*
;hin the mission structure of the Five-Year Defense Pro gran/;
jting, which was conducted within the Congressional
.ropriation structure; and accounting and management, whicj
conducted within the organizational structure of the
services
.
^Robert N. Anthony, "PRIME 69, " Kinescope Tape Address
to the Defen . Management Class, Naval Postgraduate School,
ir-cy, California, April 5, 1968.
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tlon of change in Defer.se accounting
The foregoing sections, commencing with reports of the
First and Second Hoover Co sions ( 19^-9 and 1955) followed
'ay 'che B : and Accou rocedures Act of 1950, as
amended in 1956, demj improvements leading to more effec-
amming, budgeting, accounting, and financial report-
:rai Government agencies. The Comptroller
1, in 1952, had expanded on this need concerning the
accou cts in a general letter and series of memoran-
eulminatir. . promulgation of the General Accounting
. ianual "Accounting; Principles and Standards for Federal
•ies . " Subsection 11.2 of Title 2 states: "The preferred
account structure for Federal agency activities is one in
h accounts relating to all sources of funds used to finance
such activities are incorporated into a single integrated
accounting system. "1
Subsection 8(c) of Title 2 states, "New organizational
angements, shifting emphasis on program activities, revised
legislation, and technological changes require appropriate
;es in accounting systems so that the information produced
can continue to be useful in exercising financial control over




^-Comptroller General of the United States, Accounting







and in particular the Depart-
Df Defense, failed i more prompt action is beyond
2t a short treatment of this
.s consider .te for background. Perhaps
e of the delay could be attributed to Mr. Charles J. Hitch's
,s Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) when he
3 in 1955-
Costs are measured in terms of what we call "total
"--the amount required to finance
.. in a given year, regardless of when
e funds are appropriated by the Congress, obligated,
.iced on contract or spent. Now, admittedly, this is
a cc e. Ideally, I suppose,, f ^o_-
3 of ac c rued expe nc. g_,
t to the concept of resources cc dh
account -.u.lties appeared so over-
hat w at approach, Ig-
s" in terms of obl i"* ?~ii.~bnal
; be, I'or ana prog: as to
do not eve:.;, find
: *
co C3~~ ividua l program elements in
ave a much better idea
.11 cost of 100 MINUTSMAN missiles, for example,
..sing of the actual expenditures year by
ar. And from the point of view of planning and
3ion-making we are far more interested in the full
cost of program-~in "c so complete" than in the precise
phasing of the costs. 1 (Bnphasis supplied.)
. . . Indeed, it has been my observation that it is
j.ch easier to change policy than to change procedures.
tps ahe re. at policy involves a relatively
group of people at the very top of the Defer.
n while avolve literally tens of
thousands, if not nunc of thousands, throughout the
.
... e ^abolishment a way in which they have been
igs day after day, year after year. . . .-
lH. Rowan Gaither Lectures, a series of four lectures
by Charles J. Hitch, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptrol-
r), on "Decision-Making in the Department of Defense,"





. -jor innovations embodied
.
-s like PRIME must receive the active ,rt of all
It could be inferred that Mr.
iastic on Project PRIME concepts. How-
. vj for change was a by-word during the tenure of
Secretary of Defense McNamara. In a 1961 television interview,
sing in office less than c rionth, Secretary McNamara
defined his mane illosophy as follows
:
I think that the role of public manager is very
similar to the role of a private manager; in each ca
has the c\ . of following one of two major alternative
courses of action. He can either act as a judge or a
lea In the for. se, he sits and waits \ ib-
Lnates bring to him problems for solution, or alterna-
te. In the latter case, he im »lf
he operations of the business or the governmental
;y, examines t blem, the objectives, t3
alternat . courses of action, chooses among them, and




! s a .ve role; in the other case, a
ve role. ... I have always believed in and endeav-
. to follow the active leadership role as opposed to
judicial role. 3-
Secretary McNamara' s enthusiasm and drive continued to
rvade the Defense Department; hence in 19^5^ after the
eure of Charles J. 3h, Robert N. Anthony was specific
-
.' asked by the Secretary of Defense to make major changes
'ense accour) systems, et a I . 2
for operation."
Utilizing the Five-Year Defense Program, the President's
Ibid .
2Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Defense
.is : Project PRIME
, p . 3 .

and the Congressional appropriation struct
. staff proceeded to design an
r a "crosswalk, " consisting
of ipense elements that would be comparable
to ing process of the Department of Defense, the
ng process of the Pi nt's budget, vis-a-vis the
Dcess of the Congress, while providing a
j syst which would be useful to managers
at all 1 3.
An outline for the rated system of accounts -.
b des:. Ln December of i960; thence
sd to its current form. Particularly cogent
to - art of accounts are several terms:
Operating bucket .—An approved operating pla 1 .ch
is the bag .on and financial control of
>enses and selected working capital in the execution of
or prog.
y_. --A major organizational subdivision
ty that is re risible for execution of an identifi-
able segment of a im.
i element .—The basic building block of the Five-
..." that is a description of the mission
to be undertaken and a collection of the organizational
;ies identified to perform the mission assignment.
.ements may consist of forces, manpower, materials, serv-
ices and associated costs as applicable.
ctional categories are
to collect . ise information for one or more
be follow (l) the cost of the function
required to meet lade by the Congress or
parties; (2) information on
1 »t of a function is useful in deciding on the author-
ization to be provided to an operating activity; (3) tJ
b of the on provides a control tied to an under
-
cost accounting system needed for management of the

f : :. f motion is useful in
cial analyses of cost.
se el ments spec:, y he ty
he functional category or
'
. it .on is useful in ming
its and : .lysis of performance,
.on is also ne for "object class 11 reports
st and other outside
Wit i . ind, the combined expense
of the Department of Defense^ the
.
, and the Bureau of the Budget were grouped into thir-




2. Supply Opera 'c





8. Base S ces
. Operation of Utiliti
*10. I iir of Real Property
iinor Construction
12. Other Engineering Support
13. Administratis
Elements of expense
1. Military Pes 1 (at standard rates)
2. Military T: (at standard rates)














, Oils and Lubricants
14. . .Is and Lubricants
.5. . .es
ot;
18. Service Credit -
: should note that those functional categories
3 elements .ten t i
financial reporting requirements of
Congress in connection with the appropriation process.
resent additional Department of
5e reporting requirements in response to Project PRIME.
In addition, the Depai it of Defense directed:
pense accounts . be established in such a way
ted for < expense element, within
functional category, within each program element applic-
to the operatin bivity. (Emphasis supplied.)
ti. llowed that:
Lents may add to the expense information
sment ,, but this addi-
. lust reconcile without proration or
.ion to the foregoing expense accounts.
3
Comptroller General most aptly described this system as:
. - . ies will be brought into the
\ accounting system. Each activity will budget and
account for goods and services which had previously been
.. ed free, incl rsonnel expenses.^"
. . . t of detailed accounts according to
org : it of Defense is able to attain
llbid. , enclosure (l), ")?., 1-3.
2u.S. Department of Defense Instruction 7220. 20, p. 2.
3lbId
. > p . 3 •





accounts and the cl 'ica-
, of t 3 et. This makes it ible
ment control syst
.-•nail:. - missions and a unif rt
in its ability to comply viith




In brief , the sys of accounts could be schematically
2
HOC Pi ts
. . . Who is consuming the resources?
rons ?
13 .onal c
... are . ^sources being consumed?
Operation of uti. >?
18 Expense elemen
. . , :ind o resources are being consumed?
Civi] nnei?
Shortly a: the promulgation of the functi and
.trix, the Department of Defense released
anc . and .led directive, which described the
inics of the accounting process. The more significant
n extracted as follows
:
A • system of accounts will be established
and .. sd for each DOD Component headquarters, inter-
Late c< i operating activity responsible for
he administration of operating budgets and related appropri-
d
. , p . C-
arine Corps Order P7300.9B, A Financial Guide-







; . . .
,
trual basis of accountir
rior approval of the
>ller), . . •
i will be c to exi
/star. rates/.
of in- he
in an opera : acti he
. cilities pr led by others
jost of leave accrued but
• resources no ; rora
I or and Maintenance appropri-
»d in the accountir. m for
.. »dit techni ill be used to
ide ibility center or cost center ultimately
.ble, .
-delivered rs" or "Change in
ers," will be used to hold in suspense the
riding and the value of
.sd to c. ..rein until inci
es. . • . J in undeliver rs
.11 be e detail required to it
f obligation data in is of budget activities
. the Pre. Lt's t. - .1
ny, foreca id summarized these directiv.
ice of --ion when he said in an address
tie Thi iquet of the Armed
sment - n {1966) :
The focus ._, inses, t. is, on the re .as
id ^oy ( units in carrying out their
; of tl am. ...... .-. labor, rial,
services. m has for years
[J.S. F j Instruction 7- 2,
, dated May 16, 1963, pp. 2-7.

In the buc iccount-
es act-. aed
eported as costs c
;n. . is to cha dza-
.
asurable e: nse at
:
I me . I . -ion's p< :
; I mean the supplie
Dt i - 3 ,le
accounts; the services
by the ing both servic
.ers and ma. ance,
her units in BOD. By
allocated and pre
» do not propose to , e each aircraft s*
. s] ire of Seer ara's salary; ten
with a share of
ive costs of the base. Nor do we have any
' calcul. Lation ch Army
propo. ..'-vices be c
iits on n a practical inexpensive way
of such services can be developed. 1
.. origin end evolution of Project PRIME commenced
id Second Hoover Commission reports submitted
?ess in 19^9 and 1955* respectively. Its foundation
within the of the land, specifically the Budget
ccounting Act of 1950, as amended. Should the
to r ssence of Project PRIME, he
o note the prec j pages containing prior documenta-
. enac ;s . Assistant Secretary of Defense
roller), I ny, the most recent and active
it of Project PRIME, arized it more succinctly in
.
Anthony, Assistant Secretary of Defense
: of Expense Information , " an
nal Awards Banquet, Armed




You have asked me to d -be Project PRIM .. id this
I cc in o. 'RIME involves the devel-
.xpense accounting for operating
it of Defense. Really, fc
;e of pre. '.. as this is, that is all I
. d to ss
I 3tem associates -.:ith
ring their. ^ for a ;ood expense
ace at.
r need I ac -es are reli to work
... -.1 is integrated
.1 but.
;
ms; and th :penses
•
; and that trans -
ol and hence audit
-
srfectly obvious chai .cs
.
. quite ore".
. no sophistic.-.. or*
is that we claim for it.-*-
ssistant Secretary of Defen





Ch II de PRIME as an "expense
e by the Department of
activities . To X 3 effect on tfc .rine
Comptroller, it . 3sary to review br: the
oiler, the source of funds, and -t-
5 processes prior- to Project PR then
. process s pon the application of Project PRIME,
.be "-ical purposes, the major effect
2.
In 2 on zo stating the requirements for the Depart
-
*nse to pre. lance budget," the National
Act Iment of 19^9 (PL 8l-2i6) also established
ition of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
oiler for* each military department. Title
-ct sets forti - duties of the Defense Comptroller
>se of _. . : >art »nts as follows
:
01. . . . The Comptroller shall a
.'ense in performing such budgetary
td fiscal functic ; ;ired to carry out zhe
confei - iary of Defense by this Act,
eluding, but not limited to, those specified in this
31

Si. :>rity, direction, : control
.
C02 ipt 'Oiler shall—
-ect the pi ion of . ;et
.ense; and
(2) estat . ise the execution of—
policies, and proc to be x
h organizational and admin-
istra ng to—




.1 1 p: nd statistical reporting,
(ivj nal audit, and
s and procedures relating to the
.ion of funds administered by the
t of '.. ; and
(3) -logies, clasF .-;..ons
,
a_ tatters . (Emphasis supplied.
)
)2
ary of each military depa snt,
object to the authority, direction, and control of the
Secretary of D; ...ill cause budgetii ^counting,
;istica porting, internal audit and
linistrati' national structure an
lent of which





j Department of Defense . (Emphasis
SU]
(b) There is in each of the
a Comptroller of the Army, a
Cc. er of rj, a Comptroller of the Air Force,
as it concerned.
iry department, also be a Deputy
ct to the authority of the respective
dep tal S . the comptrollers of t
•y dep 11 be responsible for all budget-
ing, accounting s and statistical report: g,
-ernal --ir re e dep,. ;i ..nd
for the a. itional structure ^.nd.
relat: bhereto. . . .-
Marine Corps, ; ilitary department
lie led this s* :.ory organization by the es^ablish-
of a similar position--the Fiscal Director of the Marine
il Security Act Amendments of 19^9 > U.S. Code ,
.. X, sec. 5001 (1949).

t1. i ctor of th 3 Corps
of the Marine C , f< - the
seal .






3 , and ace




. responsibility for .
reco] - and administe - iated
c . *
(1) Develops and supervises an j bed
g system.
(2) la re .: ible for account!. ill
. funds . . .
{3) -ops and supervises all ;ial
appropriate cost and pi Lccotmt-
: syst to accumulate data for cc.
.. action. 1
Cone it to the e jnt of the position of
.'.rector, Corps, comptroller bille also
it all major po: ts and stations and within major
ands . The duties and functions of these
are generally described in the Marine Corps Staff
1
Comptroller door :es and supervis
;o the bread s of fina; .1 man; >nt
ropriated fund activities
.
for, and coordination and super-
of the fol!
f.S. Marine C( dquarters Order P5000.3^-.» Head-













inancial adjustments required by ci ;es
,de available; and : .t of
. 7
.
. cc .inter, - of re :ords,
of obligatic ad expenditures
.
. ?ojeet c s; ma: ance of
property account and for financial






bistics .--Develop guides and
iteria f Ilection and coordination of statis-
pervise the preparation of special
St. 3 . 1
A c rison aforelisted functions of comptrol-
.ithin t.. of the Department of Defense, from
zational ui ;o the Assistant Secretary of Defen:
indicate near perfect synchronization and
ainly, no changes are required in prescribed
cc. r function .;e Project PRIME. It seems
isis- ^sis on cost accounting.
rce c
Fu ?or the planned operation of the Marine Corps for
fiscal y in a Department of Defense Appro-
s deci e C ss and approved by t
it of ' . Within the most recent
lU.S. Ma: :.ed States Marine ?f
1 {'Wa^. D.C.: Government ting Office, 1955 )>













1 by Cc: of ' ropriations ot
?ine Corps. A c*a-
from the E
t of nse. Prior to I,
trative au ity was obt d foil j a
>st frc . the Marine Corps for apportion-
.0 had
oved, additic requested from the
Ller of the Navy for an allocation of the ed
: by '., on favorable endorsement
ests, no fi uthority, external to tha Mar:
allotting funds for use by field
2 Sufc allotments to the field were then bas
*1 John A. Cottom, USMCj intervie
2U.S. : • P72C .-.;-
1_ (Wa .3.: Gover-- fc Printing Office,
4 ), .or II, p. 3-

in the bi itted
58, this process hac
in . to obtain apportion-
o be recast 3 redefined for the
.udgea,
"
( a ) Direct . .tional a
DP), inclue
..
i.e., a cc ;: en
and main ro-
(b) nge in obliga-
ted, bu ., yet





.int _anco and the excess




ly-j ti submi; .seal Year I9&9*
of field requirements i art-
•;uirements, was expanded to inc
[uirements - n ahe
(i) Tr. put for each cc
snter into civilian a.
hours , . .ants, overhead appiicatioj







.; SET* P. !

. to be
. ;, or by cc




.-'3 total ope ;t in
, for
ty. 1
proce - ; i.e., j .tion
t .. : alio t of ap
accour
.tures, etc., rev ,ny
. rences . C jor dif:.
ninolc id greater detail required by
accour. .. . ... in Chapter II; anol
creased it authority allotted to field
Lncipally, y personnel fund £ rizations
.
le previc budgetary process, field commands
Lmates applicable only to
giance j the Marine Corps Stock Fund,
to a . extent, the Procurement, Marine Corps, appro
-
.3 involved in these appropriations
cons tit._ proximately \ . t of the total Marine Corps
getary requirements .
., under centra] man-
snt . As can ter burden for preparation
it of y, Financial Mai of
'/SO ?~3006) ( . igton, D.C.: Government
Lee, 19'6..
.
ber III, p. 5.








.as mada -co them under that
. and ac Ions and ex
ital headqu »s .
the . ...
. , as a portl<
,ng of c >le
ropriation for re 3 ithin
.ppropi on, now pa , at
. . »ppro-
, to _. .
;et
Dns that tl le Corps
. . , for the request of funds to be
. Bureau of the Budget and Depai it of
budget, " exp:. ms of
.... ense
o, th£ .e "operating bi
srger of l: c fund requi s, i.e.,










via the C ? of
hole. Ti shoul
1 "ceilings , " ap riation
ints - ally ide le in
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. of an . ,;e to
3 of the A t (51 USO oS'o) , Sec-
367S -'•• ' -
ion o;
j&, he explanation of the numerical
.e key to the correlation





ned by t :
id expenditure trans
-
s : 17 -
tj 9 - one-y. ppropriation for FY59;
- Ope . Corps
.
ity .—These n rs
;ent of "avy and ic. fy
.ne Corps and the al
it.
21.—
-The first two dl
; (27)
third digit (2) identifi
.
FYDP, i.e., Program
pose Fore fourth digit (l) designates
within the Operatic
3 case, the (l) trans
-
tes to t .. Operati >udget activity. •*•
The r -ical cc of course, lends itself admir-
.ated data processing techniques
.
iu.S. Marine Corps Order P7000.5A, Proje : Imple-















































































































































































































. it 3 i :
: of a standard
. 2. S cards c; ..
b be su:: 11
ing :'fee.
jrting system. 1 1 Len
"operating budgets.," indica
varianc ss . One can e .th
.tion and co: capabili' of modern
. be compared both to t
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of Congress to . ake pay-
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Act of 1906, as £
5679 itate
79. (a. - of t:
•ize ar enditure from or ere
.on un< appropriation or- fund
s of t: . le therein; . . .
(i) (l) . . . ^umstances warrant, suspension
• fr uty, vjithout pay or removal from office . . . upon
-eviction, be not more than $t>000 or imprisoned for
no'G more than two years , or both.
In order to facilitate and -de some degree of
.formity 1 the pr< .on of budget estimates , t. .view
by Congress, and the control an .".ting
3., th been established by Co; ss
iation structure, ^s major ar require-
by an opriation . Appropriatioi rther
:o budget activities . Budget
major subdivisions of the appropriation by
For example, the Operation.. 3 Maintenance Appro
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: (l) Training and Operations, (2) Depot
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;et activil account a^j sub-functions
contained i e Con.
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CHAPTER IV
CRITICAL EVALUATION OP PROJECT PRIME
This chapter will present a sampling of the current
status of Project PRIME within the services with emphasis on
the Marine Corps . Included in this evaluation will be excerpts
from recent Congressional hearings, U.S. Navy, and Marine Corps
views, observations of the Department of Defense PRIME on-site
survey teams, and those of selected authors.
This transition, from the conceptual and statutory
foundation of Project PRIME to actual application "in the real
world, " will permit the formation of some conclusions in Chapter
V; hopefully, these conclusions will benefit both the planners
of Project PRIME and the managers, those who must use it and
make it work.
Congressional views
Despite the optimistic Department of Defense memoran-
dums j directives, and speeches, expounding the merits of Project
PRIME, the Congress does not share this view. Their viewpoint
was formally expressed by the House Committee on Appropriations
in its recommendations in Department of Defense Appropriation
Bill, 1968, as follows:




Operation and Maintenance accounts for the so-called
Resources Management System of the Department of Defense.
The principal element of this system is known as Project
PRIME, a proposal to completely alter the character of
Defense budgeting and accounting so as to bring it in
consonance with the program system of the Department.
The Committee is of the opinion that this proposal
appears to be a case of too much too soon. While it is
undoubtedly true that significant changes in the budget-
ing and accounting system of the Department of Defense
should perhaps be accomplished, and this is to some extent
true of all agencies of the Federal Government, what is
understood of the proposal under Project PRIME would
indicate a massive change which, to some extent, would
temporarily diminish Congressional control and which
appears to be proposed for at least partial initiation
without due regard for Congressional expression.
The Committee directs that there be no such change
in the budgeting and accounting system of the Department
of Defense preparatory to the formulation of the fiscal
year 1969 budget presentation.!
In general, the Senate Committee on Appropriations
supported the House Committee. To insure that Congressional
intent was maintained and enforced, the Senate proposed an
amendment to the bill, which, in its final form, reads:
Sec. 640(b). During the current fiscal year none of
the funds available to the Department of Defense may be
used to install or utilize any new "cost-based" or 'expense -
based " system or systems for accounting, including account-
ing results for the purposes prescribed by section 113(a) (4)
of the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950
(31 U.S.C. 66a(a)(4), until 45 days after the Comptroller
General of the United States (after consultation with the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget) has reported to the
Congress that in his opinion such system or systems are
designed to (l) meet the requirements of all applicable
laws governing budgeting, accounting, and the administra-
tion of public funds and the standards and procedures
established pursuant thereto; (2) provide for uniform
!u.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations,
Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1968 , H. Rept . 349
To Accompany H.R. 1073b, 90th Cong., 1st sess., p. 6.
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application to the extent practicable throughout the
Department of Defense; and (3) prevent violations of the
antideficiency statute (R.S. 3679; 31 U.S.C. 665 J. 1
(Emphasis supplied.)
At this point, the reader should note that the Depart-
ment of Defense in its enthusiasm for PRIME , apparently over-
looked both White House guidance set forth by President
Johnson's memorandum, quoted in part in Chapter II, and the
Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, as amended:
both require that approval of the Comptroller General be
obtained in the design of executive agency accounting systems/
The Congress, however, was observant of this requirement; the
net effect of Congressional action delayed the planned imple-
mentation of Project PRIME from July 1, 1967 , until at least
forty-five days after receipt of the Comptroller General's
approval
.
To obtain the Comptroller General's approval of an
accounting system was no small task. Elmer B. Staats, the
Comptroller General, stated in a recent magazine article that
only about one-third of the civilian agencies have accounting
systems which meet current Government Accounting Office stand-
ards . Of the nineteen different accounting systems within the
Defense Department, the Corps of Engineers (Civil Functions)
lU.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government
Operations, Planning-Programming-Budgeting Hearings before the
Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations
,
United States Senate, with Charles L. Schultze, Director,
Bureau of the Budget, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, pp. 62-63.
^Comptroller General, Accounting, Principles and
Standards for Federal Agencies , p. 2-69.
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is the only activity which has an approved accounting system. •
On April 12, 1968 , approximately ten months subsequent
to Congressional disapproval, the General Accounting Office
approved a second accounting system within the Department of
Defense; Project PRIME after some modification was favorably
endorsed by the Comptroller General and passed to the Congress
for reconsideration.
^
Apparently, the Comptroller General's endorsement was
still insufficient to satisfy the Congress. Both the Senate
and the House of Representatives, in their final hearings on
the Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1968, expressed
further reservations. In fact, these legislative bodies,
although now approving the PRIME concept, qualified their
approval so extensively that they cast a negative tone over
the entire project. Their views can be summarized as follows:
(a) That the "automatic reducibility" clause for
operation and maintenance appropriations, should military
personnel appropriation expenditures exceed authorizations,
be applied only at the major command level. ^
(b) That the requirement for detailed bookkeeping in
motor pools be rescinded as too expensive, in terms of
money and manpower, and seems an unwise effort at this time
when stringent economy should be encouraged. ^/Tf the
lElmer B. Staats, "The GAO's Long Range Plans for
Military Audits" in Armed Forces Comptroller (April I967), p. 3.
2Comptroller General of the United States, Report to
the Congress, p. 1.
3u.S., Congress, House, Second Supplemental Appropri-
ations Bill, 1968, House of Representatives, H. Kept. 1531




Department of Defense wishes to do further testing of the
concept, there would be no objection^^/l
(c) Any funds utilized for the purpose, beyond those
approved for already existing Department of Defense budget-
ing and accounting activities, are a matter of special
interest to the Congress and subject to prior approval of
reprogramming procedures.
2
(d) There is a lack of definite information on the cost
of the new system. The budget for fiscal year 1968 included
$52.7 million for the implementation of Project PRIME and
these funds were disallowed by the Congress. The services
requested $69.2 million during the formulation of the fiscal
year 19&9 budget, but the amount was disallowed by the
Secretary of Defense.
3
(e) There is considerable doubt as to the readiness of
the services to implement the system on July 1, 1968.4
(f) That Project PRIME may proceed in accordance with
all the restrictions of House Report 1531, provided a slow
and deliberate approach is effected in collaboration with the
General Accounting Office with perfecting actions taking
precedence over expansion of the program.
5
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps views
During the spring of 1968, the Assistant Secretary of
Navy for Financial Management, when queried regarding the
capability of Navy and the Marine Corps to implement PRIME,
responded:
Because of the magnitude and complexity of the task,
it may be several years before the system is operating at
full effectiveness. ...
1Ibid. 2Ibid .
3u.S., Congress, .Senate, Second Supplemental Appropria -
tion Bill, 1968 , S. Rept. 1269 to Accompany H.R. 17734", 90th
Cong., 2d sess., 1968, p. 14.
^Ibid .
5u.S., Congress, House, Second Supplemental Appropria -
tion Bill, 1968 , Conference Rept. to Accompany H.R. 17734, 90th
Cong., 2d sess., 1968, p. 3.
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As a result of the absence of fiscal year 1968 funds
for PRIME, individual field activities have been limited
in their ability to prepare for the system. . . . 1
The position of the Commandant of the Marine Corps
expressed in a statement to the Senate Appropriations Committee,
expanded on this theme and forecast the major problem areas
.
In this statement he said:
. . . the PRIME system is not just a simple revision of
current budgeting and accounting. It superimposes a new
system over much of the present and encompasses rather
complicated and expensive changes. . . .
My chief concern is with the adequacy of our resources
(money, people, and machine capability) to supply and make
effective use of this significantly increased detail required
by the PRIME system.
The new concept defined in Project PRIME requires a
higher caliber of personnel trained to accumulate, analyze,
draw conclusions from the data derived in the system, and
recommend management actions . Further, there are data
processing resources required to handle the increased volume
of data. . . .2
The Commandant recommended:
that full implementation of PRIME be deferred until
FY 1970;
that during FY 1969 PRIME be tried only in those areas
where adequate resources existed; and
that FY 1969 be used for further evaluation, extension
of service testing, acquisition of resources, and systems
training.
3
^Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management),
Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
Project PRIME, dated April 23, 1968, p. 1.
2u.S., Congress, Senate, Second Supplemental Appropria -
tion Bill, 1968, Hearing before the Committee on Appropriations





Department of Defense PRIME Survey Team views
This section summarizes the progress of PRIME, within
the Marine Corps, as viewed by representatives of the Office
of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). Reference
will also be made to the other military services to indicate
variances in interpretation and, to some extent, the degree
of 'acceptance by the individual services
.
Visits to Headquarters of the Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marine Corps, et al ., During Period September 3-l6, 1968
Observations
All services are proceeding with implementation in
accordance with formally developed programs, except for
the Navy; all services have issued operating budgets in
Five-Year Defense Program terms. The Army has super-
imposed the conventional Operations and Maintenance
budget activity structure; the Navy plans to issue one
operating budget for each Operations and Maintenance
budget activity. The Air Force and the Marine Corps do
not issue their budgets with such constraints . The
costing of military personnel appears to be operating
without significant problems . The Navy and the Marine
Corps rely heavily on centralized costing techniques
from the personnel reporting systems, while the Air
Force and Army operate under a decentralized system.
VJith regard to the Marine Corps, the Survey Team noted
that the system does not provide for funding the
organizational unit for services to be received from
supporting service units. The Marine Corps expressed
concern that if organizational units were funded, budget
authority would be utilized for other purposes, while
obllgational expenses continued to be incurred by the
service supporting units. The Survey Team further
noted that the Marine Corps method is not fully consist-
ent with the intent of "the PRIME system. J-
^Chairman, PRIME Survey Team, Memorandum for Mr.
Bergquist, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),





PRIME Survey Team visits — December 1968
During the month of December 1968, the PRIM3 Survey
Team visited two Army, two Navy, one Air Force, and one Marine
Corps installation. The Marine Air Station at El Toro,
California, was the first visit by the Department of Defense to
a Marine Corps field activity. The primary purpose of the
visit to the Army installations was to evaluate the service
center concept.
Observations
The service unit test /K motor pool/7" at Fort MacArthur
has been in operation for about 13 months . Organizational
units receive expense authority to purchase the service
and are charged monthly. The authority can only be used
for this purpose; on the other hand, service is not Genied
to any organizational unit that has exhausted its expense
authority . It is the general consensus of the jtort MacArthur
personnel that the costs incurred to date are not offset by
any management benefits from the standpoint of either the
customer or the performer. (Emphasis supplied.)
The service unit test cost and lack of benefits cannot
be adequately evaluated until a true seller customer relation-
ship is established to* provide incentives for customers to
critically evaluate their motor vehicle requirements.
Recommend that consideration be given to providing a test
relieved of customer constraints to allow possible "trade -
offs " within the customer * s operating budget
.
We continue to observe that operating budgets are
constrained in varying degrees by certain levels of command,
e.g., limits placed on conventional budget activities or
elements of expense.
At the Marine Corps Air Station the survey team noted
that
:
Operating targets (plans) provided to cost centers are
for material only and are on an obligation basis, rather than
on an expense basis, since obligations are recorded at the
time material is requisitioned from the stock fund. Civilian
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and military personnel costs are monitored by the Comptroller.
This installation reports the cost of military personnel
en board the first of the month at standard rates and for-
wards the report to Commandant of the Marine Corps. The
Commandant, in turn, renders a "bill" to the Marine Corps Air
Station for military personnel for the month. The "billed"
amount varies considerably, from the amount shown on the
report. The reason for variance could not be determined at
21 Toro ....
implementation of the other aspects of the PRIME system
is proceeding satisfactorily. Management officials are
completely familiar with Project PRIME. 1
PRIME Survey Team visits during period October 28 - November
15, 190b1
During this period, the PRIME Survey Team visited activi-
ties of all services, except the Marine Corps. The team's over-
all comments, although out-of-phase with the foregoing, are gen-
eral and intended to indicate a trend rather than specifically
pinpoint a service. The author feels that the Marine Corps
would also fit within the pattern; accordingly, the following
Survey Team notes are included and are considered an excellent
summary of the status of PRIME at the field activity level;
1. The variation of implementation within the services
is sometimes as great as between services. The enthusiasm
of commanders appears to be directly related to the implemen-
tation progress
.
2. There is a hesitancy on the part of several activi-
ties to shift the focus from obligation to expense even
though they have received operating budgets primarily in
expense terms.
3. Operating budgets have been constrained in varying
degrees by certain levels of commands, e.g., limits placed
on conventional budget activities or elements of expense.
4. The service unit tests of motor vehicle transporta-
tion activities are being limited by restricting the users
•
budgets or not including full cost, e.g., military personnel.
It appears that additional study and testing will be required
lChairman, PRIME Survey Team, Memorandum for Mr.
Bergquist, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
PRIME Survey Team Visits , dated January 7, 1969* with attachments
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The potential for resource "trade-offs "
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) has
indicated. that the PRIME accounting system would cause
commanders/managers/comptrollers "to think in terms of 'trade-
offs, * such as the best balance between military personnel,
civilian personnel, and contract services for mission accom-
plishment.
"
Conceptually, this was a most logical and rational
observation, as the PRIME reporting system and subsidiary
accounting records would permit these comparisons. Heretofore,
except for industrial-type activities, the cost of military
personnel as an operating expense to specific functions was
not included. On the other hand, civilian service payrolls,
contract services, and material expenditures were correlated
to specific functions, primarily through labor distribution
or job order systems.
To accomplish uniform military personnel costing and
provide for the many different pay combinations, in each rank,
based on allowances for years of service, number of dependents,
hazardous duty status, etc., it was necessary for the Depart-
ment of Defense to design a standard rate for military personnel
lChairman, PRIME Survey Team, Memorandum for Mr.
Bergquist, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
PRIMS Survey Team Visits , dated November 29, 1968, with attach-
ments
.
^Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comp-
troller), PRIME 69 (First in series of monographs) (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 10.
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of all services. This has been done. 1 Civil Service pay scales
already exist for this purpose, e.g., Salary Table No. 49.
The availability and cost of contract services can readily be
determined by bid invitations. With these publications, plus
response to bid invitations in the hands of the commander/
manager/comptroller, the basic ingredients for a "trade-off"
consideration now exists . In retrospect, however, they have
always existed except for standardized Department of Defense
rates for military personnel costs. Even then, military rates
could have been approximated, permitting rudimentary comparisons.
If this is so, why hasn't there been more emphasis in this area?
The answer is relatively simple—the commander/manager
had nothing to gain. Military personnel were assigned from
departmental headquarters and paid from a centrally-managed
separate appropriation. Military personnel could, therefore, be
considered a "free" commodity. Similarly, Civil Service
personnel authorizations were assigned and controlled from a
departmental headquarters; sufficient funds for payment were
included in the Operations and Maintenance allotments. In the
case of Civil Service personnel, however, some flexibility did
exist. Civilian personnel funds could be expended for materials
and other services, or vice versa, provided civilian employment
ceilings were not exceeded or an involuntary "reduction-in-force"
action was not instituted. In this regard, involuntary
lU.S. Department of Defense Instruction 7220.25, Standard
Rates for Costing Military Personnel Services , dated August 11,
19o~8, enclosures.
2u.S. Civil Service Commission, Salary Table No. 49
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 1-7.
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reductions -in-force of Civil Service personnel were viewed as
"poor management" and scrupulously avoided.
Now, with the operating budget concept; that is, an
aggregation of Military Personnel and Operations and Mainte-
nance appropriations, together with standard military personnel
costs and cost accounting system, the commander/manager/
comptroller has more flexibility to consider these "trade-offs."
A "trade-off" at Great Lakes Naval Training Center
A recent application of the "trade-off" concept occurred
in the negotiation and award of a contract by the commander of
the Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois, to a private
contractor for the operation of the training center's mess
halls. This contract was awarded on the basis of lowest cost,
with military, Civil Service, and private contractors competing.
The Civil Service Commission is presently contesting
the legality of the contract on the basis that contract civilian
mess personnel are managed analogously to Civil Service direct-
hire personnel to include the provision of government equipment
and facilities
.
A case in point can be recalled when a single govern-
ment-owned computer at the National Aeronautics and Space
Agency was operated by contract personnel. Coincidentally, it
was located alongside two identical computers, performing
similar work and operated by Civil Service personnel. This
arrangement was declared illegal and the contract personnel were
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replaced by the more costly civil servants. 1 The Great Lakes
Training Center matter has yet to be resolved. Based on a
similar precedent, however, the Civil Service Commission has
an initial advantage.
The author notes that this occurrence demonstrates the
existence of peripheral considerations which commanders/
managers/comptrollers must also ponder and which may outweigh
or' compromise a "trade-off" based strictly on lower costs.
Personnel overages at an Army West Coast installation
A less complicated case, resulting from charging
military personnel costs to the user, recently occurred on the
West Coast, where the installation commander reported an excess
of eighty-six military helicopter mechanics assigned to his
organization. Under PRIME accounting, the commander's operating
budget was being charged for the cost of these excess personnel,
thereby indicat-ing an expenditure rate that would prematurely
exhaust his funding authorization for military personnel.
Although the personnel overage was due to external circum-
stances, i.e., military personnel being assigned and reassigned
by departmental headquarters, this occurrence was nevertheless
the subject of a PRIME report. -Before PRIME, the commander
would have regarded the excess manpower as a bonus; now, how-
ever, excesses, both in number and by grade, will be reported.
lKeene Peterson, personal interview with Operations
Analyst, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower
and Reserve Affairs), November 1968.

IIn the long run, a more precise monitoring of individual train-
ing and personnel assignment, by departmental headquarters, will
be required to improve manpower utilization. 1
Divergent views relating to PRIME
"Budget execution should preserve the intent of the
legislature, but at the same time, maintain flexibility at all
levels of administration. 1 This statement made by Jesse
Burkhead is paradoxical, to some extent, and can best be
illustrated by the comments of a noted author and theorizer,
on one hand, as opposed to a noted military financial manager
and practitioner on the other.
As early as 1956, David Novick, a prominent writer,
submitted that a management accounting system should allow
more flexibility at lower echelons of command when he stated:
Initiative and imagination are fertilized by transla-
tion into real results and neither the military departments
nor the Congress are likely to discover the "best way" to
perform a task unless the people on the job are permitted to
exercise their ingenuity. It is easy to "second guess"
people doing a Job, but it is more difficult to be an
expert in doing it without current and real experience
.
If budgetary control is applied to insure that there
are no overdrafts in aggregate, if performance objectives
are clearly defined, and if the reporting system produces
current reports in a detail which corresponds to adminis-
trative responsibility, I can see no reason why one should
assume that a grant of authority will be abused or willfully
used to produce anything other than best possible perform-
ance. To be sure there will be mistakes but they will be
^Thomas S. Johnson, personal interview with Special
Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
November 1968.




on a local and small scale instead of an overall and large
scale basis as happens when detailed orders are laid on
at the top and transmitted through a long chain.
1
Conversely, Brigadier General George E. Brown, United
States Air Force, stated an opposite view:
Coupled with this lack of user demand for accrued
expense data is the unrelenting pressure to reduce man-
power investment in "soft" or supporting functions --such
as Accounting. The effect is to reduce financial informa-
tion systems to those needed to keep us out of jail. This
helps explain an apparent fascination with appropriation
accounting systems. The uses of data from these systems
are highly visible to the wing commander and to all above
him in the command chain. Not only do the data from these
systems tell us how to avoid very specific statutory crimes
(like over-obligation of funds), they also speak to us in
the language we must use to justify future resources
requirements .... The advertised wages of these sins
guarantee top priority to appropriation accounting systems
.
If you can afford only one kind, this is the kind you
will buy. 2
It is the author's view that both positions are equally
valid; the position adopted depends upon the current vocation
of the individual.
A closing word of caution on PRIME
The reader should recall from Chapter II, that the
PRIME accounting system permits the machine or computer
aggregation of expense data from the lowest to the highest
level. Conversely, through the use of similar programming
techniques, it would permit the selected computation of data
3-David Novick, A New Approach to the Military Budget.
RAND Corporation Report RM-1759 (Santa Monica, California:
The Rand Corporation, 1956), p. 23.
2Ceorge E. Brown, Brigadier General, USAF, "Financial
Information for Resources Management," Armed Forces Comptroller
.
January 1966, p. 18.

68
by program element, or in other words, a comparison at the
Department of Defense level of actual organizational unit
expenses to budgeted expenses; for example, F-4 squadrons in
•che Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force
.
While PRIME has been advertised as a new system to
help managers do their jobs, the system now begs the question:
What is the Department of Defense's top management going to
ask the services? Certainly, budget performance information
or any other financial data would be available monthly, down
through the organizational level (program element). If Defense
top management interrogates the services for this data, then
they are transposing themselves to the operational level. As
Defense top management is too far removed from the scene of
operations, all these top managers can do is to ask why certain
things are happening. In other words, harass operational
personnel.
John Dearden sums up the situation by stating:
One of the most common mistakes in management informa-
tion systems has been that of providing one level of manage-
ment with information designed for use by another level.
. . * top management will be deluged with information that
it can only use to check up on operating management. And
if top management uses this information to try to control
operations, it will be performing the function of the
operational manager.
2
3-John Dearden, "Can Management Information be Automated"
in Management Control Systems: Cases and Readings , ed. by
Robert N. Anthony, John Dearden and Richard P. Vancil (Homewood,





The concept of Project PRIME has its most recent origin
and foundation within the 19^9 and 1955 Hoover Commission reports
to the Congress j the essence of which has been transposed into
public law. PRIME is an expense accounting system for the
operating activities of the Department of Defense, exclusive of
fleet and tactical units. The mainstay of the system rests in
the establishment of a standardized chart of cost accounts and
elements of expense which can be identified with organisational
units and their commanders, and permit the aggregation of
measurable costs at all levels of management for programming,
budgeting, and accounting purposes. These actual expenses can
be further compared to budgeted expenses as a measure of
organizational progress against plan.
Further, the expense accounting system satisfied the
financial information requirements of agencies, or activities,
external to the Marine Corps, and the Department of Defense, and
employs standard and universally accepted accounting techniques,
such as posting on an accrual basis and double-entry bookkeeping.
I'he combination of these features was no doubt instrumental in
earning the PRIME accounting system the stamp of approval of the




The impact of Project PRIME on the Marine Corps
Comptroller is significant in that it will necessitate (l) a
more detailed and voluminous collection and reporting of expense «
information than was formerly required, and (2) a more thorough
knowledge of accounting, budgetary techniques, and expertise in
financial analysis at all organizational levels. In other words,
it will require an expansion of the functions already contained
within the Comptroller charter—with emphasis on cost accounting.
The rigidity of Congress toward the retention of its traditional
appropriation structure and accounting system, however, will
require that the Marine Corps Comptroller also remain proficient
in that system and, for the present, these expanded accounting
functions must be accomplished within existing manpower and
financial resources.
Basically, financial control systems within the Marine
Corps have remained unchanged; the overall Congressional con-
straints, i.e., "ceilings," "floors," and the apportionment
process, as well as penalties for violation (Anti-Deficiency
Act), continue as before. Although the Department of Defense
has imposed two new constraints in the form of "Total Direct
Expenses," and the "Sum of Total Direct Expenses and the Change
in Undelivered Orders," (page 48), these are restraints within
overall Congressional limitations . Only the terminology and
method of aggregation have changed. These new administrative
controls, combined with increased scope of expense accounting,
tend to make mechanization and automation of the accounting system
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Imperative for successful and timely operation. While more
flexibility in the management of financial resources is inherent
within the PRIMS system., there is continued and understandable
hesitancy by comptrollers (financial managers) to completely
discontinue the system of accounting under the traditional
appropriation structure maintained by the Congress . In the
words of Brigadier General Brown, USAF, "the advertised wages
of these sins guarantee top priority to appropriation account-
ing systems . "1
Congressional and service reaction to PRIME has been
mixed. The Congress, while approving PRIME in principle, has
been resistant to authorizing funds for its implementation and
has stipulated that any existing funds diverted to the revision
of the accounting system must receive the prior approval of
Congress. It can be assumed that this resistance on the part
of Congress has resulted, primarily, from the inability of
the Department of Defense to identify a firm total cost of the
system and its benefits over the existing appropriation structure
and accounting system used by the Congress.
Similarly, the services share mutual reservations
.
Conceptually, all would agree with the theory of Project PRIME,
i.e., improved management through a system of accounts that
results in relating expenses to actual functions. All services
^George E. Brown, Brigadier General, USAF, "Financial




would further agree and, as the cost of Project PRIME points
out—nothing is free— and PRIMS is expensive. 1 There is no
ance that the increased visibility afforded by the system
would result in significant savings or, in the long run, be
worth the cost. These reservations, particularly in the area
of motor transport services, have since been reaffirmed by
PRIME Survey Team visits to selected field activities.
In the same vein, the charging of military personnel
costs at standard rates to the field commander (user) is contro-
versial; the field commander does not control the number or
assignment of military personnel. This function, as well as
nancial responsibility, remains at Headquarters, Marine Corps.
In a sense, the allocation of military personnel costs to the
er is "window dressing," and could conceivably motivate the
commander to report overages which would generate an expenditure
rate exceeding his budget authority. On the other hand, with
Litary personnel expenses constituting nearly 60 per cent of
the total USMC budget, emphasis on these expenses at all
levels makes it inevitable that the commander and his comptroller
will become more cost conscious.
PRIME does not, as yet, offer incentive to effect
economies; there are no specific provisions for the commander
to profit by his economies, e.g., retention of personnel savings,
1Edwin H. Simmons, Brigadier General, USMC, Briefing
for the Commandant of the Marine Corps, at Headquarters, Marine
Corps, on October 31* 1968.

73
or a portion thereof, by the commander to meet other needs
.
It .d be difficult to conceive that the "state-of-mind ,
"
ed 'oy the President, whereby "cost reduction and minimal
cocto," and, perhaps, some deprivation, would be viewed as
"profits" and in themselves a sufficient motivator.
Dr # Anthony later recognized the problem when he
ited
:
The problem of motivation is the most difficult
problem that we have "go solve, and I frankly don't think
; have found a good solution so far. People don't delib-
erately waste money, but neither do they put much attention
towards saving money unless they have strong incentive to
CO so « . • «
—
However, a desirable side effect should develop; the
system will require that the services further refine their
*nt methods of determining training and recruiting require-
: and in the assignment of military personnel to insure
efficient manpower utilization.
The "trade-off" option, now more clearly visible,
rticularly in the personnel area, is conceptually sound but
hat stymied by established policies and legal precedents.
3 peripheral considerations may cancel out monetary benefits
based on cost analysis . In the case of the Naval Training
r food services contract, the decision will be based
Ly on legal precedent, economic considerations notwith-
•Z*
lRobert N. Anthony, "The Challenge of Service Account -
,
!!




Project PRIME ia designed to provide an approved plan
lich performance can be measured, variances analyzed,
and adjustments made, as necessary, to permit more effective
man jnt of "available" resources. However, "available"
resources are determined by the Congress, and may, therefore,
be significantly changed to include reductions from original
valid proposals. As Verne B. Lewis, a noted writer on
bu ; theory espoused regarding performance budgeting and
applicable to PRIMS:
lese data will show how many units are being done,
but not how many should be done. . . . They may or may
not give an indication of the quality of the work, but
they leave unanswered the question of proper quality
standards. . . . the end product of many agencies is
not measurable by any means devised. 1
hat is more likely to occur is that the reporting
system with its improved "visibility" to all echelons of review,
including the Department of Defense, will reveal variances in
operating costs between similar functions, perhaps in different
?vices. Those commanders/managers reporting above-normal
costs in comparison to their counterparts will be required to
explain, explore alternatives, reduce costs to more normal levels,
or possibly eliminate the function altogether.
As is characteristic of these times, there are always
more requirements for resources (men and money), than there are
resources available. Economies or savings in one area, if
voluntarily offered, and their retention thoroughly justified
^-Verne 3. Lewis, "Toward a Theory of Budgeting" in
Programming and Budgeting;: A Systems Approach to
ant , p. io3.
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for loyment in other areas, would probably be withdrawn by
r headquarters and reallocated to meet what they consider
higher priority needs
.
Apparently, little has changed since Jesse Burkhead
stated thirteen years ago that "budget execution should maintain
flexibility at all levels of administration. The ideal system
of budget execution can be defined simply but it is difficult
of attainment . "i
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